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Part 4

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

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OCTOBER 4, 1983

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ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND ITS REALTIONSHIPS WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room SD–138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Members present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, Wilson, Stennis, Levin, and Kennedy.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; James G. Roche, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; and Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Richard D. Finn, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, and Bruce D. Porter, professional staff members; Tamara L. Farnsworth and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Ron Kelly, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Frank Sullivan and Mary A. Shields, assistants to Senator Stennis; Arnold L. Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Peter D. Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin; Matthew Murray and James Steinberg, assistants to Senator Kennedy.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this afternoon in the fourth of its series of hearings on the structure and decisionmaking process of the Department of Defense.

In the first three hearings, we heard from the Secretary of Defense, from three outside experts on defense organization, and from a former Senator and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

In the first two hearings, our witnesses focused on the range of issues with which this series of hearings is concerned. The third hearing focused specifically on the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Today, our subject is the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff.

We are pleased to have with us three witnesses who are immensely knowledgeable about the functions of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This afternoon two witnesses will appear as a panel. Gen. David C. Jones and Gen. Louis H. Wilson.

The present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. John W. Vessey, is now at the White House. We expect General Vessey to arrive shortly; however, he will appear after General Jones and General Wilson have answered questions.

Our first witness today is Gen. David C. Jones. General Jones served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1978 to 1982. Prior to his appointment to this position, General Jones served for 4 years as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.

Our second witness this afternoon is Gen. Louis H. Wilson. General Wilson served as the Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1975 through 1979. A holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor, General Wilson served with distinction in World War II, the Korean War, and in Vietnam.

Gen. John W. Vessey, our final witness, serves as the senior military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, in his capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Earlier in his career, General Vessey served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

Both this committee and the House Armed Services Committee have been interested in the subject of the structure and operating procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for several years.

This committee held a hearing on December 16, 1982, on the subject. At that time, General Jones appeared, together with former Congressman Richard White, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, and Adm. James L. Holloway.

In addition, it is also noteworthy that the House Armed Services Committee has recently reported a bill, H.R. 3718, to amend the pertinent provisions of the United States Code dealing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to strengthen the position of the Chairman and the JCS.

This committee will consider the House bill in its deliberations on this subject.

While there are a large number of issues surrounding the JCS, I believe there are several questions which must be resolved.

Is the dual responsibility of a JCS member, as Chief of a Service as well as member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sound?

Should the JCS Chairman be in the chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the Unified Commanders?

What should the relationship be between the JCS Chairman and the Unified Commanders?

Should there be a deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

To whom should the Joint Staff be responsible, and what should be the size and composition of that staff?

What personal policies are needed to insure the proper quality and continuity on the Joint Staff?

These are all difficult questions, but they are also critically important to the effective formulation of national defense policy.

Gentlemen, we are most pleased to have you with us today.

Before we proceed, I would like to ask Senator Stennis if he has any remarks he would like to make?

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am interested in the subject matter of this hearing. I am compelled, though, because of other commitments made before I knew about this meeting, to go elsewhere.

May I leave a question for you to ask? I have it typewritten for you to ask of General Vessey.

Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. Yes, the warning bell has just rung. We have a vote on the floor. Therefore, if you will excuse us for about 10 minutes, we will vote and then we will come back and resume the hearing.

[Recess].

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

Others of the committee will join us momentarily. I apologize for the intervention of the vote.

The committee, of course, wants to hear anything you have to say. If you have a lengthy prepared statement, you may submit it for the record and we will incorporate it in full. You may summarize it or you may present it whole as you see fit. We will proceed in any way you gentlemen want.

Let me first call on General Jones.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, it is good to be back with you.

I do not have a written statement. I would just like to make some very brief remarks.

In my judgment, the subject you are addressing is the most important issue that this committee has faced in many years. The members of this committee know better than most that the threat to our Nation's very survivability is the greatest in our history.

We have what I would call a defense predicament in that our strategic needs, our overall requirements, far outstrip our resources, and even if we received every dollar in the President's budget, we would still fall far short.

The answer is not to change the strategic requirements, although I think we can articulate the strategy better, make it more coherent, establish better priorities, but we can't give up on maintaining overall nuclear equality or withdraw from Europe or Korea.

It is unreasonable to expect additional resources beyond what has been projected and, even if we had additional resources, that would not solve all the problems.

What we should be doing is what you are doing, looking at the process. I know no one in the defense business who thinks the process works well today. However, it is human nature that people believe it is some other agency that is messing it up.

In the Pentagon, it is the Congress and how Congress handles the budget. It does not come out very coherent in the end. It is already fiscal 1984 and we don't have an appropriations bill in sight.

But there are problems in the executive branch as well. The problems are institutional. They are not personal, they are not caused by individuals.

I went to work for General Curtis LeMay in the 1950's when he was building the Strategic Command. He was able to wrought miracles and bring that Command to the greatest state of readiness that any military outfit has ever had despite many obstacles.

At the same time Rickover was doing the same with nuclear power, really making the bureaucracy hum.

Both of them would have a tough time today because the system has become much more rigid and much more resistant to change.

I submit in the last 20 years there are few, if any, leaders, military or civilians, who have had much long-term impact on our defense posture, defense posture overall. There have been a few like my colleague, General Wilson, who have done a magnificent job in their career, building his service as he did in the Marine Corps, but I am talking about defenses across the board and the overall integrated effort that is needed so badly.

By the nature of things today, the system has become more cautious. The institution takes risks, but individuals don't. We have a vertical organization, but our problems today are horizontal.

By that, I mean a vertical organization of our services. The problems are integration of effort across the board horizontally. The vertical has had power and influence throughout our history.

As an example, when I was Commander in Europe, I worked for both the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Joint Command of the European Commander. I received all my money, all my airplanes, all my people, my people got promoted and were reassigned by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

I received nothing in the way of money or equipment from my Joint Commander, therefore, my service chief had much more influence on me and my command than did the joint system.

In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization is not just five individuals, it is five institutions, it is four services, and the Joint Staff. When an issue comes up, unless it is an immediate crisis that needs reaction in 10 minutes, an issue is given to an action officer in the Joint Staff and representatives of those four services.

The hidden agenda is to come up with an agreed position. Even the law says that if the Chiefs do not agree, they must inform the Secretary of Defense or the President, as appropriate.

Regardless of who is Chairman, regardless of who makes up the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if you look back in the history ever since the formation of it, the splits, the differences, have been a handful in each year. It does not vary much by personalities.

What that results in is a compromise on the papers that are prepared and submitted by the Chiefs. The tough issues are not addressed. The roles and missions, the across-the-board issues are not addressed, and I think under the current system, that is right.

I would hate to see the Chiefs start biting on the tough issues today because it would lead to divisiveness in the current organization.

After World War II, the Air Force and Navy got into a very bitter fight over aircraft carriers and bombers and it reverberated through the system and it was very difficult for people to work together.

The services learned then that these relative issues cannot be addressed within the current organization and if they did start to address them, they would go back to great conflict.

The Chiefs work very well together. I had a good relationship with all my colleagues when I was a Chairman and I know General Vessey has the same today, but we pay a penalty for it.

The Chairman can play an independent role in his own right although some of the legislation proposes that the Chairman give his views in his own right.

As Chairman, I gave my views in my own right and other Chairmen do, but the Chairman is constrained by two things.

First, he has only five people working under him on issues of substance not including aides and secretaries. The rest of the staff work for the corporate body of the Chiefs and the system does not let you forget that the Joint Chiefs works for the corporate body and not the Chairman.

Second, the Chairman's effectiveness depends on his being able to get agreement of his colleagues on hundreds and hundreds of items that come across in meetings three times a week, usually all afternoon. If he tried to raise very controversial issues and be far different, maybe, than some of the servics on some of the issues in the morning, and in the afternoon, he tried to get his colleagues together to agree on six different subjects, his effectiveness would be undermined.

So, you ought to understand, when you are dealing with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the constraints that are on him.

Finally, what changes should be made? I recommend that we strengthen the horizontal system, not by going to a General Staff, not a person in charge of all the services as my original article was misinterpreted, that somehow I wanted a single Chief of Staff of the armed services.

What I am saying is, let the Chairman represent the horizontal, let the Service Chief represent his service, still have the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Have the Joint Chiefs meet with the Chairman, give their advice to him.

The Chairman, based on inputs from the Chiefs, from the field commanders and from the Joint Staff, would make his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Anytime the President and Secretary want to meet with the Chiefs, fine. That would still be the provision. Any Chiefs who didn't agree with what the Chairman said in his input and felt strongly enough about it could make an input to whomever would receive that advice, such as the Secretary of Defense or, in some cases, the President.

Chairman TOWER. File a minority report, so to speak?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

I think it would be much more clearcut when there is one name signed to the piece of paper and it is your paper and there is a minority report by somebody else.

I would do some other things. I would give him a deputy. I wouldn't give the joint system control of personnel promotions, but I would give it greater say.

The British made these changes before the Falkland crisis. They had, essentially, our organization or we had their organization. They

went to what I recommended before Falkland Island, and they are very pleased they did.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members, for your attention.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Jones.

General Wilson?

STATEMENT OF GEN. LOUIS H. WILSON, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I, too, am delighted to be here again after almost 5 years and I appreciate the opportunity.

I certainly agree with you on the importance of an effective defense structure and decisionmaking process. Since 1947, DOD has evolved into a complex and ponderous organization.

In the House Armed Services Committee last year, I presented my views. I was opposed to the Jones-Meyer proposals and I am still opposed on most issues.

You will see that when General Jones and I testify. We are old friends. We both served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff together when I was Commandant and when he was Chief of Staff of the Air Force and later, for 2 delightful years for me.

We had our positions then and we will have our positions this afternoon. On the other hand, this has nothing to do with our close friendship and relationship over the years—as it should be for colleagues in any profession.

I would like to chat just a minute about the bills which are currently floating around Washington. I will call them the administration bill which is a bill sent over by the administration and the Nichols' bill which is known as H.R. 3718. I believe those terms are generally known.

In considering the current proposals together, it is not clear to me what is meant by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Are the administration and Nichols' bills speaking of him as an individual or as a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General Vessey has said previously that he considers himself to be a spokesman for the JCS and that he has no objection, although he obviously will have a chance to tell you about it, to that in these bills if the Chairman was considered as a spokesman.

If so, I believe it should be clearly spelled out so that future generations will have no doubt.

Mr. Chairman, Murphy's law applies as to interpretation here as it does in most places. If it can be misinterpreted, it will be misinterpreted.

If in the two bills the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to be the spokesman as opposed to an individual, then it certainly should be cleared up because it would be misinterpreted.

I consider the language of the two bills to be imprecise and unclear. I shall provide a few recommendations later.

I believe that the intent of Congress in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was to prohibit a single Chief of Staff, to insure alternate points of view, to mandate civilian control, and to have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff speak and act on behalf of the JCS.

It is my belief that it is still the intent of Congress and the American people to maintain these same guidelines. Frankly, I would respectfully say to General Jones, no matter what he says about a single Chief of Staff, that his proposal would gravitate to a single Chief of Staff if the Chairman is the only one in the chain of command and is speaking only as an individual.

I do support three recommendations for change.

First, I believe the Chairman of the JCS should be a member of the JCS. I have been shocked that the NSC is composed of only four permanent members, all of whom are appointed by the President, including the Vice President who is indeed an appointee of the President. The others are there acting only as advisers.

Although I understand that now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is always there as an adviser. It has been my experience in the past that he has not attended all NSC meetings. Of course, it is up to the President whether he wants to have the Chairman there or not.

Furthermore, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on behalf of the JCS, provides continuity for present and future administrations. The Chairman's term of office is not contingent upon the President's term of office.

In other words, the Chairman would provide the conventional wisdom which would move from one administration to the next. I think this is important. The Chairman is not a politician by law and by conscience. Therefore, he is outside the swirling waters of politics as administrations change.

I can see why the Secretary of Defense might not like to have a subordinate as an equal in this instance. On the other hand, I believe that a Secretary of Defense could see that, at the same time, the Chairman would provide the continuity.

Second, I believe the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be in the chain of command; however, again, acting only on behalf of the JCS. I believe this is a glaring defect in the current bill.

Third, I believe we should modify the statutory restrictions on the Joint Staff. I don't think it is a major problem. We are nit-picking and dickering over price, as it were, when we talk about adding another year to the existing 3 year tour.

On the other hand, I am saying that it opens up a Pandora's box of problems when you increase the number of officers and the length of tours.

Furthermore, I believe the DOD personnel structure is almost like an hourglass. We have a monolithic office of the Secretary of Defense which has the authority to reach down into the services to select officers for assignment. We have numerous assistant and deputy assistant secretaries, each of whom, when they come in, build his own little empire.

As a result of this they think they are civilian control. After all, the Secretary of Defense is civilian control, but each one of the assistant and deputy assistant secretaries thinks that he is obeying the law by exercising civilian control.

I think eventually that the DOD personnel structure should be like a prism to the extent that General Krulak discussed with you earlier—Secretary of Defense at the top, the OJCS in the center and the services with fewer people at the bottom.

Now, the services have many people at the bottom because they have to respond to all the requests and demands that come in from their seniors.

On the other hand, I don't think this is the time to reorganize. So, I have no real problem with this exception.

Now, I believe, if you want to change the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that you should go back and change the Reorganization Act of 1958 which prohibited the Chairman from becoming a single Chief of Staff. Don't initiate specific new legislation up front, don't circumvent the issue by addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Finally, it is the military's responsibility to fight our country's battles.

Mr. Chairman, let me tell you that if you start this business of having young officers coming in, staying four years on the Joint Staff, going out for a year, coming back again, they will be quick to perceive that this is the way to a "star," which is the ultimate ambition for a professional officer.

Then because they don't dangle participles, split infinitives, and end sentences with prepositions, suddenly these officers find that this is the way to the "star" instead of going out to command a battalion, to command a squadron, command a ship or where their career is always on the line and where they learn responsibility.

Since the Revolution the hallmark of the American fighting man has been his initiative. Leaders and technology have given the United States what we have today. We can never match the Russians man to man and tank for tank. We must develop our leadership potential to meet U.S. national security needs.

We have bright, capable officers who need experience of command. They don't need to make a career pushing a pencil and pasting words end to end. Leadership is the key. It always has been and it always will be.

I thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Wilson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. LOUIS H. WILSON, 26TH COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: It is a pleasure for me to return, once again, to Washington and be with you today. I certainly appreciate your invitation and this opportunity to present my views on Department of Defense Structure and Decision Making. I fully agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that the organization and relationships of the defense elements within the Executive Branch, both civilian and military, and their capability for effective decision making is of utmost importance to our national security.

Since 1947, the defense establishment has evolved gradually, yet continuously into a complex organization; and, at the same time, the tasks of providing for our national security have also grown in complexity. As you have previously stated, and I strongly concur, we must have the most effective defense organization possible to meet the ever increasing future security challenges. Therefore, in my remarks today, I hope to address the effectiveness of our capability to develop and execute a sound national security policy. As a result of my previous military experience, my remarks will be oriented primarily toward current and proposed military capabilities. However, I will be glad to respond to your questions on other matters.

Last year (April 29, 1982), I presented my views before the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the proposed changes to the JCS organization by Generals Jones and Meyer. I did not agree with

their proposals then and, over the intervening eighteen months, I have not had any significant change of mind. I do recognize that some form of change to the JCS organization is inevitable and indeed desirable. However, to spare you the details of my previous position, I will address only current issues and initiatives of which the genesis of some appear to be the original Jones/Meyer proposals.

I have some recommendations regarding the recent initiatives on JCS reorganization embodied in the proposed administration bill of April 1983 and view with some concern the proposed Nichols Bill (H.R. 3718) which is currently before the House for vote. In my view the initiatives in these two proposed Bills, if taken literally, would increase significantly the role and functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an individual to the detriment of the Service Chiefs as a corporate body.

These initiatives include:

(1) Placing the Chairman, as an individual, directly in the chain of command (instead of using the Joint Chiefs of Staff) between the National Command Authorities (the President and the Secretary of Defense) and our operational commanders—the commanders of the unified and specified command (CINCs).

(2) Orders from the National Command Authorities would be issued through the Chairman, as an individual, to the CINCs.

(3) Making the Chairman the supervisor (commander?) of the CINCs. The definition of supervisor is not provided.

(4) Making the Chairman (as an individual) the spokesman for the CINCs for operational requirements.

(5) Making the Chairman (as an individual) a permanent member of the National Security Council.

(6) Allowing the Chairman to manage the Joint Staff and Director of the Joint Staff, but not on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(7) Allowing the Chairman to select officers from Service nominations for Joint Staff duty.

(8) Allowing the Chairman to communicate directly to the President on the performance of flag officers (O–8) on the Joint Staff when they are being considered for promotion (thereby, implying that the Chairman's recommendation concerning promotion potential outweighs a Service Chief's recommendation).

These initiatives would be added to the Chairman's already existing functions of presiding over the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), providing the agenda for JCS meetings, assisting the JCS to carry on their business, informing the Secretary of Defense and/or the President of those issues upon which the JCS have not agreed, and participating as the sole voting military member of the Defense Resources Board since 1980.

I also find myself confused by the impreciseness of the proposed legislative language of the bills under consideration. What specific future role for the Chairman is really intended by the proposed legislation?

Frankly, gentlemen, if these proposed changes are enacted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although nominally retained as the principal military advisors to the President, Secretary of Defense and National Security Council, could become impotent in a practical sense. In effect, we would set ourselves on an inexorable path whereon the Chairman inevitably would become the single Chief of Staff of our Armed Forces. It, perhaps, may be efficient from a managerial standpoint, but it is dangerous from the point of view of balanced military advice on the vital issues of national security.

In analyzing the present organization, it is helpful to refer to the intent of Congress concerning legislation for DOD organization, as reaffirmed in the Reorganization Act of 1958, and determine if the rationale used then is still applicable today. Here are four points which I consider significant:

(1) The establishment of a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces is prohibited.

(2) The creation of an overall armed forces general staff is prohibited.

(3) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is denied command authority over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any military forces.

(4) The Joint Staff is prohibited from operating or being organized as an overall armed forces general staff or having any executive authority.

An analysis of this existing legislation concerning the current organization shows that the establishment of a single Chief of Staff is prohibited because the concentration of power in one military man would violate the existing principles

of civilian control of the military now exercised through the Secretary of Defense, and indeed rival the President's power as Commander-in-Chief. When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff speaks, it should be understood unequivocally that it is on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body.

In addition, again taken literally as in the proposed legislation, such a powerful individual conceivably could prevent minority or majority views on military problems from reaching the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, or the President.

Clearly, a single advisor would narrow the views and limit the alternatives provided to the National Command Authorities, while increasing the authority of that individual who does not have the ultimate responsibility for executing the final decision.

I ask you, can you imagine a General LeMay as Chief of Staff of the Air Force not being consulted on strategic bombing, or an Admiral Nimitz as the Chief of Naval Operations on naval operations, or a General Eisenhower as Chief of Staff of the Army on strategy, or in these days, the Commandant of the Marine Corps who might not be consulted on amphibious operations?

The result of these initiatives would be the isolation of the National Command Authorities from legitimate alternative and leveling points of view provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By law and by background, they provide expertise and responsibility for military strategy during their deliberations. As Service Chiefs, they bear the responsibility for preparing and providing resources for the forces that must respond to the unified commanders for the plans and policies issued by President and the Secretary of Defense.

There is no question that it is the clear intent of Congress, your predecessors, that the Secretary of Defense be the individual with the power and authority necessary to carry out the difficult defense decisionmaking roles. I believe that these principles still apply today. It therefore seems obvious that whatever shortcomings there may be in the functioning of the Military Establishment—and indeed there are—they may not properly be attributed to lack of authority of the Chairman as an individual.

Let me tell you, the Chairman has the authority that the Chairman is willing to exercise. It would appear there is little, if any, greater authority that could be provided to him as an individual unless it were specifically or implicity surrendered by the corporate body of the JCS, Secretary of Defense, the President, or the Congress.

The present structure with the full and equal representation to all Services under the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept, and subject to the clear and undisputed authority of civilian leadership, is a sound and effective design for national security. The present organization is undeniably subject to improvement, but there is ample authority and opportunity to effect change internally under present law and within the existing framework of the organization with a few improvements which I shall list later.

General Vessey in representing the JCS in testimony before the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in June of this year reiterated this point, It is my understanding that, over the past year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have undertaken an extensive review of their structure, responsibilities and the decisionmaking process. I believe that as a result of their analysis, the JCS have already initiated actions to improve the current system, and will continue to address and resolve deficiencies within their system.

Now, let me turn to the recent initiatives specifically involving service with the Joint Staff. The purpose, as I understand these initiatives which in essence would modify the statutory restrictions on the Joint Staff, would be to improve the overall Joint Staff process and capabilities. As individual inititaives, I have no problem with any one of them. However, taken in light of the proposed major changes to the role and functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the recent HAC mark on management of CINC headquarters funding, all at the expense of the JCS and Service Chiefs' influence, I must urge caution in considering these proposed enhancements to the Joint Staff. We should be careful in opening Pandora's box for what the future might hold. As the Chairman speaks on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so too should the Joint Staff serve the Chairman on behalf of the corporate body of the JCS.

A specific restriction on the Joint Staff within the current law prevents it from being utilized as a general staff or from exercising any executive authority which the law gives to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am also opposed to the selection of the "best" officers, as envisioned in the Nichols Bill, for Joint Staff duty, which I consider an elitist strategy. This

would create only ill feelings among the officer corps of the Services and failure for selection to Joint Staff duty could relegate all those not selected to be considered "second best."

Although I have expressed my concern over the recently proposed initiatives, I do think that there is some room for improvement particularly in the external relationships between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other parts of our national security establishment. If, and only if, the role and influence of the JCS as a corporate body is maintained or even increased, I would enthusiastically support placing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the National Security Council. I would also enthusiastically support legislation placing the Chairman in the chain of command between the National Command Authorities and the CINCs. However, my support for these two recommendations is conditioned by the strict provison that, in these operations, the Chairman directly represents and speaks on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. Only then can we be assured that the spirit and intent of civilian control of the military is maintained while providing effective and timely military advice to our civilian leadership and effective communications between the National Command Authorities and the CINCs. Therefore, I recommend that the language of the proposed legislation be clarified in all cases such that the Chairman is acting on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With respect to modifying the current statutory restrictions on the Joint Staff, I do not have any major problems with lifting the ceiling on the number of officers on the Joint Staff and extending tour length for officers who serve on the Joint Staff as contained in the Administration Bill. I would support only these provisions to increase Joint Staff flexibility, but again I urge that a wary eye be kept on the future direction of expansion.

In summary, I believe that the current system with the slight modifications enumerated above best meets the requirements for effective decision making, particularly in maintaining the present, corporate influence and experience of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide for our total national security.

As in most reorganizations, the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is subject to personalities within it. The system is basically sound and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the authority necessary to make it work.

I strongly emphasize that we must reassert the influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. At no time, should the Chairman speak for himself unless specifically identified as such. The positive caveat that the Chairman acts on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be included in any proposed changes to the future role and functions of the Chairman, such as the Chairman on the NSC and in the chain of command, but on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Without this emphasis, the JCS would cease to function eventually as an effective corporate body.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by stating the obvious: It is the military's primary mission to fight successfully our country's battles. To succeed in the future, we must continue to develop the leadership potential of our bright, capable officers through command, staff and technological experience to meet our national security needs. Exotic new weapons and voodoo reorganization techniques notwithstanding, leadership is the key ingredient as it always has been and always will be. This concludes my statement, sir, I am ready for your questions.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Wilson.

Gentlemen I would like to limit the questions to 5 minutes today because we do have to hear General Vessey.

Gentlemen, I would like both of you to comment on this.

What is the proper balance between civilian and military advisers in resolving key defense questions?

General JONES. I did not understand the question.

Chairman TOWER. What is the proper balance between civilian and military advice in resolving key defense questions?

General JONES. There is no question, Mr. Chairman, the civilian control is and should be very pervasive.

Where I think our problem arises is that the military advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President tends to be more service-oriented than across the board. That is understandable.

The Chiefs of the services have their own constituency. Therefore, what has happened over the years is defense secretaries have turned to others to address the contentious issues.

I remember when the analysis had their head of steam, they were called the whiz kids, they were given the contentious issues.

What I would like to see is for the secretary to get vertical advice from the services, horizontal advice from a joint system that is not service dominated. It would be a single Chief of Staff who would address the tough issues and give the Secretary of Defense clearcut alternatives. The decision would rest with the secretary and with the President based on advice from military people, not just an individual.

Today too much of the advice to the Secretary on contentious issues comes from people who have had very little experience in defense. They come and go about every 28 months and do not have the expertise that is necessary.

Chairman TOWER. General Wilson?

General WILSON. I agree with General Jones that obviously civilian control is necessary.

I believe that military advice should come from the services, but the final decision should be made by the Secretary of Defense with input from the national command authorities because after all the national command authorities have much more to consider in the way of national policy than just military factors, to include economic, psychological, and political factors—all of those factors which go into the making of decisions.

I think General Jones would agree with me, in fact he has already said that the military advice should come up through the service channel.

Of course, I differ with him in the sense that he believes it should come from one person. I think that a broad spectrum of military advice is necessary.

You see, if I might interject here, it seems to me that there is a pervasive opinion that there should be one voice because people wear a uniform. We are all prisoners of our past experiences. Each service chief and the chairman have come up through a different set of experiences which should be integrated at the top, yet consensus is not necessary.

The chairman has the full authority to indicate that "This is my advice." He is the senior officer of the armed services and should provide this advice.

I must say on General Jones' behalf that I always felt that he fully and fairly represented my views if I was on the disagreeing side with him. I am sure that my other colleagues felt that way, too, because he was a marvelous chairman.

At the same time, I think both dissenting and majority views should be given to the Secretary of Defense for use in his military decision-making process.

As an example, when Secretary Regan and Mr. Feldstein had their differences last week on how to fight opposing inflation, was there some law that prevented Mr. Feldstein from making a recommendation?

Obviously, there are differing points of view which have to be resolved by somebody. I resist the fact that if you wear a uniform, a consensus and a single point of view from the military is necessary

General JONES. May I add a point for my friend and colleague, General Wilson.

The current system does not say Mr. Feldstein and Mr. Regan have to get together and agree on a piece of paper or disagree on a piece of paper.

Chairman TOWER. The joint system, however, would dictate at some point in time they will get together?

General JONES. Now they independently go to the President. I want to make it very clear that I am not suggesting there be a single military voice in this country.

I think on the joint issues we should have the joint system headed by the Chairman and the services provide their views. You will hear the military voice strongly through the services.

As you well know, most of the hearings over here are service-oriented hearings. Those voices will not be muffled in any way, shape or form.

Chairman TOWER. My time is up.

Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Wilson, your written testimony states the Chairman has the authority that the Chairman is willing to exercise. I am adding a word there.

I presume, General, you intend to say that the Chairman has all the authority that the Chairman is willing to exercise.

Is that a fair reading?

General WILSON. I think so, except that he would be within the chain of command which he is not now. Today, by custom, the orders are transmitted through the Chairman acting on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator LEVIN. Your point is that he has all the authority that he is willing to exercise.

General WILSON. That is right.

Senator LEVIN. I am wondering if General Jones would comment on that, having been Chairman.

Did you have all the authority that you were willing to exercise or not?

General JONES. I think I exercised the authority I had. As I mentioned earlier, a Chairman is constrained by a number of factors, some in law, some in practice.

One, he has only five people working for him on matters of substance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff work as a corporate body.

Second, the Chairman's effectiveness depends on getting the agreement of his colleagues from hundreds and hundreds of colleagues.

The act of 1947 gave little power to the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman. Since then, great power has evolved to the Secretary of Defense, but the Chairman's position has changed very little.

Senator LEVIN. My question, though, is in your experience as Chairman, did you have all the authority that you needed in your opinion?

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General Wilson is saying that the Chairman, in effect, has all the authority that he is willing to exercise, all that he needs.

Did you have all the authority you needed?

General JONES. I would put the Chairman in the chain of command as recommended by the current administration. He is not in the chain of command today.

Senator LEVIN. General Wilson agrees then. But in terms of the authority as Chairman, you thought you had adequate authority?

General JONES. The Chairman has no authority as such. He has authority to call a JCS meeting. He has authority to set the agenda, but if any Chief disagrees with any action, the action will not move until it gets on the agenda.

So, anybody can force an issue onto the agenda. The Chairman has powers of persuasion, but very little authority. As Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I had much more control, less influence. As Chairman, I had more influence, but no control.

Senator LEVIN. General Wilson, General Jones indicated that the hidden agenda is for the Chief to come up with an agreed-upon position, both by tradition and to some extent by law because of the reference to it, if there is any disagreement, it must be reported.

Would you agree that is the impetus, the driving momentum on the Joint Chiefs to come up with an agreed-upon position, a consensus position?

General WILSON. I do not, Senator Levin. As a matter of fact, I believe that it has to do with the personalities involved. Again, I am not criticizing General Jones because I served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff with him and also with General Brown when he was Chairman.

The point is that the Chairman can set the date on the agenda, "I expect this to be done at this date." I can never remember a time when the Joint Staff did not come up with completed staff work once the Chairman had set an agenda date.

However, the JCS did not necessarily come up with an agreement every time. Again the Chairman may and should go forward and say, "The Army and the Navy agree with this, the Marine Corps and the Air Force think this way, and I think this way."

Senator LEVIN. You then do not agree that the momentum, the drive, is to come up with a consensus position?

General WILSON. I do not believe that is necessary.

Senator LEVIN. It is not necessary, but that is what happens.

General WILSON. It may have happened in some instances, but it is not necessary.

Again, it is up to the Chairman. This is where I say he has power.

General JONES. Mr. Levin, I think it is independent of personalities. If you look back from day one of the JCS until now, the percentage of splits has not varied substantially regardless of who is Chairman and who are the Chiefs.

General WILSON. I do believe, and I think General Jones agrees with me, sir, that we make a lot of to-do about a very small percentage of those items which come before the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon which agreement is not reached.

Wouldn't you agree with that, Dave?

General JONES. Yes.

General WILSON. Certainly less than 10 percent; more like 2 percent of those items about which we are talking, although I am just pulling a figure out of the air.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. I will yield to Senator Wilson.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Wilson?

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask both General Jones and General Wilson whether or not they feel that the Chairman or for that matter any of the members of the Joint Chiefs have adequate access to the President?

Presumably you have adequate access to the Secretary. Do you think that the President receives directly sufficient direct military advice from the Chairman and from the Joint Chiefs?

General JONES. I think it is human nature that everybody would like to have more access to the President. It has varied in my experience from President to President.

I think right now if you asked the Joint Chiefs, they would say they have good access to President Reagan and wouldn't have any big problems or any concerns right now, but it will vary from President to President.

General WILSON. Yes, sir, I agree.

In my experience, which is less than General Jones', because I was there only 4 years, it does vary from President to President.

He has only so many hours in the day. He does not necessarily have to see us to get information. Certainly there is access to the Secretary of Defense; there is not any question about that.

Senator WILSON. In your experience, gentlemen, was the quality of the Joint Staff all that you would have asked for?

General JONES. I am surprised that we get as capable officers as we do. We get quite a few capable ones. On the average they don't do anywhere near as well as the services on promotion—this is particularly true in the more senior ranks—to make general or commodore.

Therefore, people don't strive to get on the Joint Staff or into the joint system or if they do, they want to get in and get out.

One of the problems is that the Joint Staff has 100 percent turnover about every 28 months. I have always found it a little amusing that a person can be on the service staff in the Pentagon for a number of years beyond that, come back in a short time, and they were never thought to be in an ivory tower, but if a person stayed on the Joint Staff very long, they were sitting in an ivory tower.

But it is not the way to get ahead in the service, it is not the way to become a chief of service. Very few service chiefs have ever served on the Joint Staff.

So, the more capable people don't strive, even though we get very capable officers, to get on the Joint Staff.

General WILSON. Of course, General Jones has had experience here in watching officers on the Joint Staff. I thought these officers did a good job. You must remember, though, that there are demands, Senator Wilson, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. More officers are in the Office of the Secretary of Defense than are on the Joint Staff.

As I understand it, now there are 500 to 600 officers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They want the "best." The Joint Staff wants the "best." The commanders in the field want the "best."

You want Colonel Geraghty who is commanding the Marines in Lebanon to be the "best." The "best" is like beauty. It is in the eyes of the beholder.

One of the proposals would allow the Chairman to reach into the services and select the "best." There is no way that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except when he gets information from within the Joint Staff: "I know a good officer that is serving at Fort Bragg, N.C.," can do this.

In other words, there is a broad spectrum of capabilities within the officer corps which must be spread across the whole spectrum of assignments within research, command and staff including the Joint Staff. We simply cannot have writers versus fighters.

Now, I don't mean to be simplistic about this; but I believe that officers should have a background with broad experience here because the business of the Armed Forces of America is to fight our country's battles.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Kennedy?

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join in welcoming our panel.

General Jones, in your earlier testimony you talked about how strategy and priorities could be better developed and shaped under a different organizational structure.

All of us who are interested in this type of reform obviously are not interested in it just to shuffle around the JCS or the organizational charts, but rather to insure that any Secretary of Defense and any President are going to get the best range of opportunities and choices when it comes to military decisions.

I think the case that you make about the vertical pressures is convincing.

I would expect, as someone new to this committee, that the case which is going to be made by the services is not going to be as broadly based.

But just looking back, if you can, or even looking at the present, how do you think the strategy or priorities might have been somewhat different if we had the type of organizational structure you have recommended?

General JONES. I think from a budgetary standpoint we would have fewer disconnects. For example, we have tended over the years to neglect being able to move our military forces in different places, mobility.

The Army is dependent on the Navy and the Air Force to be able to be moved. This tended to have the lowest priority in the services, moving somebody else. This is true of many of the things that cut across the board in multiservice command and control.

Many of these issues tend not to get the emphasis that a mainline service item has.

I believe in the Vietnam war we would probably have received sharper and clearer views. Each service, with all sincerity and with all patriotism, thought that the best way to end this war was to give service a bigger share of the mission and more of the resources. We ended up making it a United States war rather than a Vietnamese war and we found out that would not work.

It would not solve all the problems, but at least it would illuminate to the civilian leadership alternatives and gaps and capability much better than the vertical system does by itself.

Senator KENNEDY. In terms of strategy could you look into your crystal ball and make what observations you might as to alternative defense strategies?

General JONES. We are taking great risks today without recognizing the great risks, by trying to do everything, to do everything in the strategic nuclear field, tactical nuclear, more air defense for the United States, thinking about space defense, longer war in Europe, greater involvement in Southeast Asia, 600-ship Navy, greater sustainability, more economic base capability or more economic production rates, better mobilization capability, and we tend to pick and choose among those and not come out with a good overall coherence and decide where we are going to be short.

We are going to be short someplace. We can't do all of this.

What I would like to do is to better articulate the overall strategy and the priorities within that strategy and make some tough decisions, and there will have to be some tough decisions made.

Right now we tend to kick the can down the street by cutting a little here, a little there. Delaying this program, and that causes a "Catch-22" situation with everything tending to go up in price.

So, I would like to bring it in sharper focus. We have never costed out the strategy. One attempt was made 2 years ago and it was leaked to the press that it would be $750 billion more than projected in the 5-year program.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me ask, if I could, General Wilson, how would you assess General Jones' assessment of the current situation without necesarily reaching his conclusion about what needs to be done?

General WILSON. I think his assessment is pretty good, Senator Kennedy.

I would say that reorganization will not help the goal that he is seeking. The point is that the Secretary of Defense eventually has to make the decision. The Chairman has to come up with a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense.

Now, there is widespread opinion, and I think it is justified in many instances, that the services, in their parochial character, gather unto themselves little things, each seeking a larger mission and more money.

I believe that is really a mistaken opinion. However, you are not going to change that opinion if somebody really wants to believe it.

The facts are that the President selects the service chiefs and the Senate consents to these individuals with whom you have placed your faith. The fact is that the service chiefs grow with their job. They understand that they are the service chiefs and that they are a member of the top corporate body of the JCS.

I disagree with General Jones. I think he said today, and we have discussed this in the past, and I believe he testified previously that this is too big a job for one individual. I do not agree.

The service chief has plenty of help and, therefore, he is in a better position to sift through all the work.

I agree with you on mobility. I think this is something on which we should concentrate in order to get our forces to the areas in which we will fight our battles. We are not trying to defend the shores of America. After all, the Marines are the ones who are most conscious of mobility.

So, I think these decisions can be made. Deadlines can be met. There need not be a consensus. Those who have the authority can listen to military advice and then, make a decision. The military officers then march off with a cheery "aye, aye, sir," which I expect my subordinates to do. As a matter of fact, I don't know anybody in the chain of command who should do any differently.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. I have just a comment, rather than a question.

I am somewhat amused by the fact that Congress is looking for ways to make the executive branch more efficient, considering our own committee structure and the diffusion of power that we have in the Congress. To give you an example of what I am talking about, let us suppose that we were able to abolish the Budget Committee, and the Appropriations Committee, that Senator Tower was the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and there were no, or few, recalcitrant subcommittee chairmen, and that he had total power to push through——

Senator KENNEDY. I thought that is the way it is now. [Laughter.]

Senator WILSON. I think these are some things that we didn't know.

Senator COHEN. That thought brings joy to the Chairman's heart and fear to the hearts of others.

The fact of the matter is that as we try to have this balance, we are always weighing the benefit of diversity opinion against the efficiency of a more streamlined decisionmaking process. I don't know where the arrow falls in that.

To the extent you have a more powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it seems to me that while there is an up side in the quicker decisionmaking, the down side is that you might have a problem, for example, like the Rapid Deployment Force issue which was a subject of great debate in the Joint Chiefs. Perhaps the initial concept of what the Rapid Deployment Force should be is quite different today from what it originally was.

The question I would ask is, to the extent that we have the reorganization, as the former Chairman recommends, would that not cut down or at least dilute that diversity of opinion which has balanced back and forth today and which has today benefited our conceptualization of the mission of the Rapid Deployment Force?

General JONES. Senator Cohen, I believe it is just the opposite.

First, I am not recommending an all-powerful Chairman. I am recommending a fifth spokesman. You have four Chiefs today who speak in their service role up through their services.

I would have the Chairman make recommendations on what I would call the horizontal issues across the board. On problems such as the Rapid Deployment Force the service chiefs would have their input through the services and to the Chairman. As I mentioned before, any service chief who didn't agree with the recommendation of the Chairman, if he felt strongly enough about it, could make his input to the Secretary of Defense on that joint issue directly.

So, the voices would be heard in a very clear way as opposed to being a part of a committee that comes to a compromise.

I must say in my opening statement I had some criticism of Congress. The way Congress operates today, I think it would be better off with one big dartboard and make decisions that way. At least we would get a budget sooner.

Here we are in fiscal 1984 and we are not even close to having an appropriation bill.

Senator COHEN. Let me say in rebuttal, notwithstanding deficiencies of this body, DOD has done all right.

General WILSON. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment here, mostly for General Jones.

It depends on how much you want to have a debate here. General Jones says he is not looking for an all-powerful Chairman. I know he is sincere.

However, the facts are, as I said earlier about the bills, that an all-powerful Chairman would be there. In both the Nichols' bill and the administration bill, they speak of the Chairman of the JCS without putting the five words "on behalf of the JCS." Thus, he would inevitably become an all-powerful Chairman and the rest of the JCS, although voting, for all practical purposes might just as well be disbanded.

If, in fact, General Jones wants the service chiefs to go to the Secretary of Defense if they feel strongly about it, he is just pushing problems and pushing responsibility up the chain of command.

Why not keep it where it is. Let the problems be worked out with a deadline. No consensus is necessary. The Chairman is perfectly free to give his views as he has done in the past and perfectly free to report the other Chiefs' views which he has done so well in the past.

So, why not keep the organization as it is rather than push problems up to a man who has more responsibility.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, thank you very much. We appreciate your contribution to the hearing.

We do have some additional questions by Senators who were not able to be here. I recognize neither of you have the commands or staff or resources that you once had.

However, if we could submit some questions to you for response for the record, we would appreciate it very much if you could make a timely response the best way you can.

General JONES. And the answers are normally much shorter when you have to do them yourself.

General WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask if I might impose on my marine colleagues to answer these questions. They have the proper facilities although I would not want you to think that the answers would be parochial.

Chairman TOWER. I understand that, General. I think any marine source you can commandeer. They say you are never an ex-marine, you are always a marine.

General WILSON. Thank you very much.

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be with you.

General WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Our next witness is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey.

. General Vessey, you may submit your prepared statement for the record, if you like, and summarize it. Then we will proceed to questions.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General VESSEY. I have a very short statement, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. You may proceed any way you see fit.

General VESSEY. I would like to go through it. I won't read it, but I would like to hit the points that I have in it.

On behalf of my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today as this committee looks at organization and management of our national security.

As I come before this committee the first time after the death of that great American, Senator Jackson, I would like to pay tribute to him. Certainly we in the uniformed services feel deeply the loss of his service to the country and certainly as you address this topic you are addressing here, I remember his participation in the 1958 DOD Reorganization Act. That was really the last major effort at reorganization of the Department of Defense.

On June 14 of this year, all of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I testified before Chairman Nichols' Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on this same general topic. The topic was the organization of the Joint Chiefs. Here I recognize that yours is much broader, but my contribution to your topic is very much along the lines of what we developed before that committee.

I would respectfully refer this committee to the hearings of that committee because all of the Chiefs were present and gave their views.

Now, I must tell you that it was not the present Chiefs, but included two previous members who have since left, General Barrow, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and General Meyer, the Chief of Staff of the Army——

Chairman TOWER. As the song says, we have just begun and we will hear from all of them, too.

General VESSEY. When I became Chairman in June 1982 I had a meeting with the Commanders in Chief of the unified and specified commands and with my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff on my first day on the job and we agreed on a general menu of things that we needed to pursue.

Among those was an examination of our own organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We talked about it for some time and we agreed that because of the unique words of the law and because of the personal duties assigned in the law the JCS would take on that job personally, that we would not invoke the use of the service staffs or the Joint Staff because we recognized that each of the services had its own staff theologian and the Joint Staff probably had its staff theologian. We also agreed that we would not use the Vice Chiefs of Staff, but we would do the work personally.

We also agreed that we would look at every one of the recommendations that my predecessor, Gen. David Jones, who was just in here, had made about improving the operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and we agreed that we would look at each of the recommendations

that Gen. Meyer, then a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had made about improving the JCS.

We agreed on four criteria that we would use to judge each of these proposals for change.

The first of those was, would the change improve our ability to wage war if we were ever forced to go to war?

The second was, would the change provide the President and Secretary of Defense with better and more timely advice than the present system?

The third was, would it better insure that the requirements of the Commanders in Chief of the unified and specified commands are addressed in the defense decisionmaking process, because, after all, it is they who will fight the Nation's battles if we have to go to war. No one has suggested changing that particular part of the law.

Last, would it improve the ability of the Secretary of Defense and the President to get the most defense out of a fixed budget?

A few weeks after we agreed to undertake the examination, the Secretary of Defense asked us to undertake an examination. We told him we had already started and we told him we were using those four criteria.

He asked us to add a good fifth criterion and that was, would the suggested changes maintain civilian control of the military for the United States?

We incorporated that criterion into our examination.

As a starting point for our examination, we looked at the duties that are outlined for the JCS in section 141 of title 10, United States Code. The examination confirmed for us that those are the right duties for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A further examination brought us to the belief that the key challenge for anyone who would reorganize any part of the Department of Defense and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff is how to enhance the effectiveness of the Secretary of Defense because, after all, when you look at his duties in the law and his relationship with the President, his relationship with the services, and the combatant commands, he is the key man in the Defense Department, and his duties go considerably beyond those of most other Cabinet officers.

So, to sort of sum up this examination which went on for some months, we concluded that any changes or reforms must focus on how the Secretary uses the JCS, his military advisers, as a part of his Department of Defense organization.

We concluded that the Secretary's effectiveness depends on how well the JCS carry out those duties prescribed for them in the law and within three interdependent relationships. The more we examined the problem, the more important those relationships seemed to us.

The first relationship is the relationship between the President and the Secretary of Defense, on the one hand, and his body of military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand.

The second relationship is the relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body and the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

The third relationship, also a very important one, is the relationship among the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves. Every member except the Chairman has another job that is a completely different job from his

duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is head of one of the uniformed services and he builds forces for the unified and specified commands. When he comes into his duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he has a completely different set of duties and he has to put aside his service chief duties.

I guess that can best be illustrated by something that happened recently, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff were addressing a particular issue, the Chief of Naval Operations had a certain position. I said to him, "I can understand why you have raised this position from the point of view of the Chief of Naval Operations, but as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representing the commanders of the unified and specified commands, I cannot support your position."

He said, "Mr. Chairman, I see what you mean and I recognize that as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I can't support my position as Chief of Naval Operations either, and I change it and now support your position."

Now, I would say to you that we also concluded then that the existing law already gives us most of the latitude we need to improve the effectiveness of our own operation. In cooperation with Secretary Weinberger the JCS are working to do that now.

Some improvements have already been made and others are under way. We believe that with the continued support of the Secretary and the President, we have the opportunity within existing authority to continue to improve our effectiveness.

Nevertheless, we did conclude that some changes needed would require changes in the law. The JCS made recommendations to the Secretary. These changes were incorporated in the DOD bill submitted to both Houses of Congress on the 18th of April of this year.

The JCS recommendations which were in that bill were in two parts.

First, we recommended that the statutory restriction on the size of the Joint Staff and the tenure restrictions in the law on officers of the Joint Staff be changed to augment and strengthen their support to the Chiefs. We believe those changes are necessary so that the size of the Joint Staff can be adjusted when necessary to insure it has the number of officers needed to carry out the duties assigned.

Second, we recommended that section 124 of title 10 be changed to place the Chairman in the formal chain of command. The Chairman presides over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he communicates, at the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, orders to the commanders of the unified and specified commands. That proposed legislation would make that explicit in the law.

The way the law now reads the JCS advises the Secretary, but the law does not put any military officer or military staff between the Secretary and the President and the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

In examining some of the other things that have been proposed, we concluded that it was not necessary to specify that the Chairman is the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the President and the National Security Council, as was recommended by Dave Jones. The Chairman has ample opportunity to provide his advice under existing law.

We also concluded that the Chairman should not have a full-time four-star deputy chairman. We wrestled with this long and hard, but finally unanimously concluded that he should not.

We gave careful consideration to General "Shy" Meyer's concept of having a national council of senior military advisers apart from the chiefs of the services and we concluded unanimously, with General Meyer concurring, that that council was not required. I should amplify for "Shy" Meyer that his conclusion was subject to the fact that the other improvements that we were suggesting to the Secretary of Defense all take place.

We also concluded that it was not necessary or appropriate to revise the law to subordinate the Joint Staff specifically to the Chairman. The law now provides that the Chairman manages the Joint Staff and its Director on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

You also asked me to comment on the House Armed Services Committee's recommendations. I would comment on three of what seem to be the main proposals in H.R. 3718.

It contains the provision that, "Subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary, the Chairman supervises the commanders of the combatant commands and acts as their spokesman on operational requirements." It seems to us that this is consistent with the JCS proposal that the Chairman be placed in the chain of command.

The same bill that was reported out also suggests making the Chairman a member of the National Security Council. That was an area that was not addressed by the JCS in our consideration, but as we look at it now, it seems to us that it has some clear benefits. It enables the National Security Council to insure that the senior uniformed military officer participates in all its deliberations about defense matters. The Council would have the Chairman, who is the spokesman for the JCS and CINC's, present as it looks at national security policy.

Now, I want to tell you that under the present President that is what happens. I attend all National Security Council meetings and for all practical purposes, I am a member of the National Security Council. The President calls on me for my views at every single meeting.

However, in fairness to my boss, I must tell you that the administration does not support that particular proposal and when asked about it, the Secretary sent these words to Chairman Nichols.

The Department does not favor that provision of the bill making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a member of the National Security Council. Subsection 141(b) of Title 10, United States Code designates the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisers to the National Security Council. The JCS Chairman attends all meetings of the National Security Council and the Joint Staff provides a working member of those groups and committees which prepare papers for the National Security Council deliberation and decision. Existing provisions of Title 10 assure that adequate and complete military advice is brought before the National Security Council. Additionally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a full member of the National Security Council would blur the distinction of the basic precept of civilian control over military activities.

We told the Secretary that we didn't agree with him. We recognized that under President Reagan what he says is true, but it may not be true under other Presidents, and we suggest that it might have some merit.

There is a third point in H.R. 3718 which deserves a word and that is the suggestion that would authorize the CINCs of the unified and specified commands to comment formally on reports and recommendations of the Joint Staff before the JCS review them. The JCS think that is an unnecessary, inflexible rule. When appropriate and when there is time available, we consult the CINCs for their views and we don't believe that should be in the law.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the JCS duties outlined in section 141 of title 10 are the correct duties and carrying out those duties requires three healthy relationships:

The relationship between the JCS and the President and the Secretary; the relationship between the JCS and commanders of unified and specified commands; and the relationship among the JCS themselves.

I would say to you that all the people involved, the President, the Secretary of Defense, the members of the JCS, and the CINCs of combatant commands have to work to keep those relationships healthy if our present system or any mutation of the present system that I can foresee is to work effectively.

The administration has proposed two law changes which the JCS believe will improve the present organization. Otherwise, the law as now written gives ample authority to the JCS to perform those duties if those relationships I pointed out are healthy.

Mr. Chairman, I am ready for your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Vessey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: On behalf of the JCS, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today as you continue your hearings on the organization and management of our national security process. It is a broad undertaking which deserves constant review. Today, as we continue to work to ensure the effectiveness of our strategy of deterrence, we must also, as Chairman Tower has recognized, continue to seek ways to improve the decisionmaking structure for national security matters.

On appearing before this committee, I note with sadness the absence of that great American, Senator Henry Jackson. His death was marked by all with a deep sense of loss. During his life of distinguished public service, he contributed immeasurably to the development of a sound national defense. I single out Senator Jackson's participation in the 1958 DOD Reorganization Act, in particular—the last major effort to address the topics that Chairman Tower has made the subject of these hearings.

On 14 June 1983, I along with all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified before Chairman Nichols' Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The topic was improving the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I recognize the broader context of this committee's interest, but that testimony relates directly to the scope of this hearing, and since all members of the JCS at that time had an opportunity to express their views, I would respectfully refer this committee to the transcript of that hearing.

When I became Chairman in June 1982, I agreed with my colleagues on the JCS that we would undertake a review of our organization and our way of carrying out our responsibilities. As a basis for that review we recognized that the effectiveness of the JCS is a direct function of the relationships the JCS maintain with the Secretary of Defense and the President, with the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (the "CINCs"), and with each other, as members of the JCS. Accordingly, we decided to address the issue personally rather than involve our staffs. We also agreed that we would specifically address the recommendations for change made by my predecessor and those made by General Meyer, then a member of the JCS.

We agreed on four criteria we would apply to all proposals for change:

Would the change improve our ability to wage war if we're ever forced into one? The ultimate test is the ability to move from peace to war and to fight the war to a successful conclusion, should deterrence fail.

Would it provide the President and the Secretary of Defense better and more timely advice?

Would it better insure that the requirements of the commanders in the field, the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands, are met? These commanders in chief, the "CINCS," are the ones who will execute the war plans and fight the battles; and their needs were a key part of our review.

Would it improve the ability to allocate national security resources more wisely and efficiently—helping the President and the Secretary of Defense to meet their difficult responsibility of getting the most security from a fixed budget?

The Secretary of Defense asked us to add a fifth criterion,

Would the suggested changes maintain our national legacy of civilian control of the military? We added and used that criterion.

As the starting point for our examination, we used the duties of the JCS prescribed in section 141, Title 10, US Code. Our examination of those duties outlined in the law confirmed for us that those are the correct duties and responsibilities for the JCS. Our examination also confirmed that the challenge for any "reorganizer" is how to enhance the effectiveness of the Secretary of Defense, because he is the key man in the Defense Department, a man whose duties go considerably beyond those of most cabinet officers.

We concluded that reform must focus on how he uses the JCS, his military advisors, as a part of the entire DOD organization. His effectiveness depends on how well the JCS carry out the duties prescribed for them in the law and on the three interdependent relationships I mentioned. Further, we concluded that the existing law already gives us most of the latitude we need to improve the effectiveness of our own operation. In cooperation with Secretary Weinberger, the JCS are working to do that now. Some improvements have already been made; and others are underway. The JCS believe that with the continued support of the Secretary we have the opportunity within existing authority to continue to improve our effectiveness.

Nevertheless, we also concluded that some of the changes needed would require changes in the law. The JCS made recommendations to that effect to the Secretary. These changes were incorporated in the DOD bill submitted to both Houses of Congress on 18 April 1983. The JCS recommendations which were incorporated fully in that bill had two parts:

First, we recommended that statutory restrictions on the size of the Joint Staff and tenure of its officers be changed to augment and strengthen their support to the chiefs. The changes are necessary so that the size of the Joint Staff can be adjusted when necessary to ensure it has the number of experienced officers needed to assist the JCS and the Secretary of Defense in carrying out their assigned responsibilities.

Second, we recommended that title 10, US Code 124, be amended to place the Chairman in the formal chain of command. The Chairman presides over the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and he communicates, at the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, orders to the commanders of the unified and specified commands. The proposed legislation would make explicit the Chairman's functions as a link between the Secretary of Defense and the unified and specified commands, an arrangement which already works well in practice.

In our examination of other proposals for change, we concluded it was not necessary to specify that the Chairman is the principal military advisor. The chairman has ample opportunity to provide advice under existing law. We concluded that the Chairman should not have a full-time, four-star deputy Chairman. Similarly, the JCS gave careful consideration to the concept of a national council of senior military advisors apart from the chiefs of the services and concluded that such a council was not required. We also concluded that it was not necessary or appropriate to revise the law to subordinate the Joint Staff specifically to the Chairman. The Chairman is already responsible for the management of the Joint Staff and its director on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Chairman, in your letter to me you also asked me to comment on the House Armed Services Committee's proposals; therefore, at this point, I will make a few comments on the main proposals forwarded from Chairman Nichols' Com-

mittee, H.R. 3718. The JCS have reviewed the provisions in H.R. 3718, and we support those provisions which place the Chairman in the chain of command and the provisions which remove restrictions on the Joint Staff. These were consistent with the Defense Department's bill. There are three proposals in H.R. 3718 not in the DOD bill which deserve comment.

H.R. 3718 contains the provision that "subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the Chairman supervises the commanders of the combatant commands and acts as their spokesman on operational requirements." This proposal is consistent with the JCS proposal that the Chairman be placed in the chain of command.

Making the Chairman a member of the National Security Council was an area not addressed by the JCS in their review, but the proposal has clear benefits. It would enable the NSC to have the senior, uniformed military officer participate in deliberations involving US military capability and preparedness. The Council would also have the benefit of the Chairman as spokesman for the CINCS who, as combatant commanders, are charged with implementing the President's decisions. The proposal would formalize in law a practice which exists under the present President, and should exist under all Presidents.

On a third point, the JCS do not agree with the provision of H.R. 3718 which would authorize the CINCs to comment formally on reports and recommendations of the Joint Staff before the JCS review them. This provision could lead to inflexible rules which would hamper timeliness and quality through bureaucratic layering in the staff process. The views of the CINCs are always sought as a matter of course when time permits and when appropriate. This change is not needed.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the JCS duties outlined in Section 141 of Title 10, US Code, are the correct duties. Carrying out those duties requires three healthy relationships: (1) the relationship between the JCS and the President and the Secretary of Defense; (2) the relationship between the JCS and the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and (3) the relationship among the JCS themselves. All of the people involved, the President, the Secretary of Defense, the members of the JCS, and the CINCs of the combatant commands must work to keep the relationships healthy if our present system or any mutation I can foresee is to work effectively. The Administration has proposed two law changes which the JCS believe will improve the present organization. Otherwise, the law as now written gives ample authority to the JCS to perform their duties if those relationships I pointed out are healthy. Mr. Chairman, I am ready for your questions.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, General Vessey.

We have a vote on now. I would suggest, Senator Levin, that you and I go vote and we will come back with our questions.

If you will excuse us now, General, the buzzer has sounded and we will have to vote.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOWER. General Vessey, to lead off the questions, do you believe in the current system that views of civilian officials overshadow or infringe on, in any way, the views given by professional military officers in areas of decisionmaking that should be dominated by the military?

I know this is a very delicate question for you to have to respond to, but I would appreciate a very candid opinion as a professional military man.

General VESSEY. I think it is fair to say there are a lot more civilian views in the defense business now than there were when the Defense Reorganization Act of 1947 was written. It has grown rather steadily, not only inside the Department of Defense, but we also have a half dozen think tanks with large staffs right here in the city of Washington.

You pick up the newspaper every day and read some critique of either our defense or somebody else's that says: "Joe Blow, defense expert, says so and so."

Chairman TOWER. Members of Congress read these articles and give you a lot of trouble over it.

General VESSEY. There are a lot more civilian views. I think it is fair to say, as the JCS told the Secretary of Defense, that through the years things that were once considered military views have moved to the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense. We, as Chiefs, believe that there is some overlap and duplication now and that we can work with the Secretary and police that up. The Secretary is ready to work with us to do that.

Now, I think it is also fair to say at the same time that when you look at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in many cases the reason for the move to civilian staffs of the Secretary of Defense is either the Chiefs in the past sometimes did not give the views that the Secretary felt he needed or he didn't like the views, and he went elsewhere to get advice.

Now, the law says the JCS are the principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense, but the fact of the matter is he can get advice from any place he wants. I guess the Secretaries over the years have done that. They can do anything from reading Beetle Bailey to consulting the think tanks out there. That is why we said that the relationship between the JCS and the President and the Secretary of Defense is very important.

That body of Chiefs that met with me on the 18th of June last year said we are going to work on that relationship. I went to the Secretary and said, "Mr. Secretary, I believe that we, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, need to meet with the President regularly," and he said, "I agree with you." He said, "We will get that arranged," and we have done that. That has to be done. You just can't wait for the President to call. He has a million other things to do.

As I said in the prepared statement, that relationship has to be kept healthy.

The answer to your question, yes, there are a lot of civilian views. Do they overshadow the military views? I guess sometimes they do, but I think that it is our duty as the JCS to make sure that our views get in there.

We made a rule for timeliness. We said the Secretary of Defense and the President need to get military advice before they know they need it. If we give it to them before they know they need it, then we have given timely advice. If they have to ask for it, it is probably too late.

So, what we have tried to do is work to achieve that goal. To say we have been completely successful, of course, would be wrong. But I think we are working at it and I think we are doing reasonably well, and the Secretary does look to us for advice.

Chairman TOWER. If I can hone this down a little further, we tend to think of our system as one in which the civilian authority makes policy and determines when policy will be implemented by military means.

Once having done that, ideally as much as possible within the parameters of political constraints, one should leave the decisions on how to implement policy to the professional military man.

Do you feel there is any inhibition on you in some instances where determination has been made to implement policy by military means to the extent that professional military judgment has been ignored, overridden, or anything of that sort?

General VESSEY. No, not in my term as the Chairman. I think the military way to carry it out has been left to the military side of the house.

Now, I should say that there are certain parts of the defense business, for example, what weapon systems, how to arm our forces, that are key issues that we, as a Nation, have to wrestle with.

Chairman TOWER. We get into that business in the Congress.

General VESSEY. Exactly.

Chairman TOWER. I expect you would not pull any punches and any criticism you may have of the extent to which we get into micromanagement of defense business, and whether we tend to be derelict in honoring the best professional military judgment when we make our decisions on what weapon systems to authorize and appropriate money for?

General VESSEY. That is a tough point and the Congress has a very difficult job to do.

Chairman TOWER. Here is your opportunity and you have complete immunity.

General VESSEY. I think at every level we dabble into too much detail. I understand why we do it and it is part of our system. However, I think we should discipline ourselves to police it as much as we can.

The thing that I would say to you is that on the military side of the house, the services, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, generally try to construct their forces to carry out the jobs that the President and the Secretary tell them they should be able to carry out.

Now, they devise tactics and weapon systems to carry out the battlefield tasks given them. The people who do that are fallible human beings just like you and I. They have some ideas sometimes that don't pan out. When those ideas don't pan out, then the whole integrated system that they had in mind doesn't work as well as it ought to.

Now, at the same time, if you present an integrated tactical system to the Congress, and the Congress decides, "We don't like this particular part of it, we will take this part out," then that also weakens the integration of the entire system.

Chairman TOWER. I think that is really basic to what I am driving at. I would really like you to tell us if we have, in fact, done that. We want to modernize the Army Ground Forces. Of course, there are obvious things like the M1 tank and Bradley fighting vehicle that we support.

But do we actually thwart your efforts to modernize your Ground Forces and have integrated tactical capability by some of the line decisions that we make?

General VESSEY. I want to answer that question yes, but at the same time I sit here and wrack my brains for a specific example.

It is fair to say that there are many Members of the Congress, particularly in this committee and in the House Armed Services Committee, who are just about as knowledgeable on defense matters as anybody around, including those of us in uniform.

They have spent many, many years on these committees and understand what it is that we are trying to do. By and large, it is not the wish of those people to destroy the integration of our system.

The question is whether or not we can make work what it is that we are proposing in terms of weapon systems. We Americans are impatient. We want it to work now and we want to demonstrate that it is going to work the first time around. If it does not so demonstrate, then we want to junk it.

I contrast our system with the Russians, and I am not proposing we adopt the Russian system, but I would simply point out to you that the Russians have many times tested a system that has had failure after failure after failure and they go on for 4 or 5 years. But they understand what they are trying to do on the battlefield and they just keep working until they get it fixed. Some of their military systems had failures for 5 and 6 years. Finally, they just marched on until they got it fixed and now the thing is out there working and we are disturbed because it is out there.

They have a lot more patience than we have. We are impatient and I think that is something we have to live with.

Chairman TOWER. You can do only so much RDT&E on something. Finally you have to call it off and test it to see if it works.

General VESSEY. That is right. You have to get it in the hands of the troops out in the field because your idea in the first place about how it will work is probably not quite right.

Chairman TOWER. General Vessey, Senator Stennis is unavoidably detained with another responsibility. He would like me to pose the following question to you in his behalf.

One of the proposals for reorganization in the Department of Defense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would put the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command of our military forces.

Under title 10 as it now stands the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs acts on behalf of the collective body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not as an independent commander.

I would like your view to clarify any new proposal for putting the Chairman in the chain of command. Would you have objection to clarifying language following the word "Chairman" by inserting "acting as spokesman for the JCS?"

General VESSEY. Let me say that the Chairman is always the spokesman for the JCS except when he is the spokesman for the Secretary of Defense and the President to the JCS. He carries messages both ways. He carries military views to the Secretary of Defense and the President and he carries decisions from the Secretary of Defense and the President to the JCS.

Under the Secretary's present administrative regulations he sends military orders based on those decisions to the commanders of the unified and specified commands. That is exactly the way we see that proposal in the law being carried out. That is to say the Chairman has a military staff that puts the decisions into military language so that the commanders of the unified and specified commands can understand those orders of the Secretary of Defense and the President. He always has the Joint Chiefs of Staff as advisers and certainly he must inform them of exactly what is going on. He does that routinely.

I think that is the important point of putting the Chairman in the chain of command.

There is another part of the law which tells the Secretary that he is not supposed to have a military staff other than the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the Joint Staff. He needs to put those civilian orders into military language that is clear for the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Vessey, to what degree are the Chiefs expected to be advocates for their own services, and to what extent is the Chief expected to put aside his own service needs for some higher goal or some broader priority of all the services?

General VESSEY. I think that the members of the JCS have to do both those things. They have to be advocates for their own service and that is one of the great strengths that they bring to the JCS.

Our Armed Forces are made up of the various services and we hope the President has selected and the Senate confirmed the most capable officers to head those services. They bring the best views about how those particular services can be used to carry out the Nation's defense functions.

At the same time they have to be able to rise above the particular needs of their own service because when they come into the JCS there is nothing in the duties of the JCS that says "make the Army a strong Army" or "make the Navy a strong Navy." The duties are to provide strategic plans and strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the United States, to provide joint logistics plans to support the strategic plans, and to foster joint training—that is training of all the armed services—to develop education policies for all of the armed services and to represent the country on the U.N. Military Committee.

There is nothing in the duties of the JCS that has anything to do with their other duties. That is the point I tried to bring out in the earlier statement, that when the Chiefs march into the JCS to do the duties laid out for them in the law as members of the JCS they have a different set of duties than when they go back to their offices as Commandant of the Marine Corps or Chief of Staff of whatever service it is.

They have to divide those two duties sensibly.

Senator LEVIN. How does a Chief resolve that conflict in his mind? Suppose he advocated it because of the service he represents; he will also have to, at some point, compromise, set it aside, give up something to get something.

What goes through that Chief's mind? How does he resolve the inherent conflict you have just described between his two goals, one to try to reach the best total result, the other to represent and advocate the causes of his own service?

General VESSEY. It is a decision that each of those officers has to make himself, but it is not much different from the sort of conflicts he has to resolve within his service.

I tried to cite the example of the Chief of Naval Operations in my opening statement. When the Navy put its program together this year it had one facet of that program which was to make things better, to make things run easier for the Navy.

I accosted the Chief of Naval Operations with it and said, "I understand why you have done it as Chief of Naval Operations." I said, "I might have done it, but," I said, "I, as Chairman of the JCS and representing the commanders of the unified and specified commands,

cannot support your program in that fashion and I intend to make this recommendation to the Secretary of Defense."

He said, after he thought about it, "I understand exactly what you are saying." And he said, "I as a member of the JCS can't support the position I took as the Chief of Naval Operations and I, too, will support the position that you have taken."

I would not say it is an every day occurrence because the issues being addressed as members of the JCS are not every day in conflict with the issues that the Chiefs have as Service Chiefs, but it is not an uncommon occurrence.

Senator LEVIN. It is not uncommon?

General VESSEY. It is not uncommon.

Senator LEVIN. To what extent is there a momentum and desire to resolve differences to come up with compromises as consensus positions?

To what extent is there a kind of unspoken agenda to reach that consensus?

General VESSEY. I can only speak for my own term here as Chairman and the 3 years that I served as Army Vice Chief of Staff and as an acting member of the JCS other than reading the history and hearing what others say about it.

But from my own personal experience—let me address my term of service. When we met on the 18th of June last year we agreed that we would not waste a lot of time looking for compromises if compromises seemed to weaken the defenses of the United States from the perspective that we as individuals have. If we had differences, we would highlight those differences and bring them up and try to explain those differences to each other so that we could understand them better. But if we had differences, we would invoke that part of the law that said the Chairman is required to explain to the Secretary of Defense and the President when the JCS disagree.

In my term as Chairman we have not spent a lot of time looking for compromise. We had a number of times when Chiefs had changed their position after listening to the arguments of the other Chiefs.

I guess the one I would highlight is the one particular one, in fact the only one that we have really had a split on, and that is the one on whether or not to support closely spaced basing.

Of course, we didn't agree, and I explained the differences to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Secretary and the President made their decisions based on split views.

The whole thing got an awful lot of publicity and much of it started with the hearing in this hearing room, the fact that the JCS didn't agree on that.

From where I sat I understood those disagreements and I understood why they didn't agree. Eventually we came to an agreement on a completely different solution.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. General Vessey, thank you very much.

Senator Levin, unless you would like to ask additional questions, it is my intention to conclude the hearing now.

Senator LEVIN. If I could have one more followup to that. I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman.

Do I read from what you said at the beginning of your answer that you think it would be harmful if the Chiefs unduly tried to reach a consensus?

General VESSEY. No, not at all. It is much better for the Secretary of Defense and the President if we give them unanimous views. That is very clear. They understand that. We recognize the importance of unanimity in our views, if we can reach a unanimous decision. At the same time, we made that pledge to each other that we would not look for a watered-down solution in order to come up with unanimous views.

I guess what I would say to you is my experience has been that on the knotty questions where we have had disagreements they have generally been on the long-range sorts of things and have revolved around different views of how the world might appear to us when it comes over the horizon 10 or 15 years from now.

We recognize that none of us is clairvoyant. So we spend a lot of time exploring those issues, and where we have finally reached unanimity it has been because one or the other of the Chiefs has convinced the others that his position is right.

We spent a lot of time, for example, on the strategic arms modernization and arms control issue. We met around 60-some times during the year on that subject alone. So, we spent an awful lot of time on that subject because we recognized we were dealing with a very difficult subject.

We started out with almost fundamental disagreements across the board with none of the five of us having the same position as any of the others.

We finally came to a unanimous position on what to recommend for the country.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. General Vessey, thank you for appearing this afternoon.

There are additional questions we would like to submit to you for response for the record.

Thank you again for appearing.

General VESSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The questions submitted with answers supplied for the record follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN TOWER, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ADVICE

Senator TOWER. I would like to ask you about the relative importance of civilian and military advice in decisionmaking within the Department of Defense (DOD).

Does the advice of DOD civilian officials now overshadow that of professional military officers in areas of decisionmaking that should be dominated by the military?

How can the role of professional military advice be maximized in the DOD decisionmaking process?

General VESSEY. Sometimes civilian officials do overshadow professional military advice. My response is that the professional military advice of the Chiefs, as a minimum, must be heard.

As to the second question, I believe that the heart of maximizing the DOD decisionmaking process is improving the effectiveness of the Secretary of Defense through improving the support rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Through

our proposals and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff fulfilling their responsibilities under the law, the Secretary of Defense would receive better, more timely military advice on matters pertaining to military policy, strategy, planning, and programing. The Secretary and his Staff would then be able to focus more attention on matters of policy and management rather than on military strategy and service programs.

MILITARY ADVICE

Senator TOWERS. Does the current structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) yield the kind of military advice that the President and the Secretary of Defense need to carry out their responsibilities?

General VESSEY. Yes, the current structure as established under Title 10, US Code and with the changes to the law recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the JCS the necessary framework to provide the NCA good timely advice.

But I want to emphasize that if the 3 relationships mentioned are not healthy, then, regardless of the structure, the military advice will not be good. We must tend to those relationships.

QUALITY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator TOWER. How do you judge the relative quality of first, the personal recommendations made by JCS members, and second, the written recommendations made by JCS members?

General VESSEY. In my view, there is little distinction between the quality of "personal" and "written" recommendations. The personal recommendations by JCS members offer the unique perspective from the senior uniformed officer of that Service, responsible for those areas unique to his Service. The written recommendations made by JCS members evolve from a corporate view of what is best for national security. Either type of recommendation seeks to provide the best advice to the Secretary of Defense and President.

RELATIONSHIPS

Senator TOWER. In an earlier hearing, General Victor Krulak argued that the success of organizations like the JCS depends more upon their individual members than upon the way in which they are organized. He quoted the saying, "It is not the boxes on the chart, it is the blokes in the boxes." To what extent does the successful operation of the current JCS structure depend upon the characters and personal relationships of the Chairman and the Service Chiefs?

General VESSEY. LTG Krulak is right. The advice is only as good as those giving the advice.

BUDGET ALLOCATION

Senator TOWER. To what extent have the Joint Chiefs of Staff been involved in the budget allocation process within the Department of Defense?

General VESSEY. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not establish the fiscal limits or dollar toplines for each Service. Nonetheless, our impact on the budget allocation process is significant. Our role is preparing the strategy to meet national objectives, establishing the planning force levels, and advising on priorities necessary to counter the threat. This, in turn, is an important consideration for the administration to allocate budget levels among the various government departments and for the Secretary of Defense to establish fiscal guidance for the three military departments and Defense Agencies.

DEFENSE RESOURCES

Senator TOWER. Should the Joint Chiefs participate more actively in the process that determines the allocation of defense resources? If so, how should their participation be integrated into this process?

General VESSEY. The Joint Chiefs of Staff currently advise the Secretary of Defense on the balance and capabilities depicted in the Military Department Program Objective Memorandums. Their annual risk assessment also includes extensive reviews of joint programs or programs that otherwise affect another Service. In general terms, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, within the agreed force levels they have recommended, each military department is in the best position to determine its own requirement for equipment and personnel to comply with the Defense Guidance.

There is, however, an increased consciousness of a need for a stronger Joint Chiefs of Staff role in resource management. They have an important role in validating joint requirements and their advice is particularly useful in matters which directly relate to deterrence and warfighting. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is a voting member of the Defense Resources Board and the Defense System Acquisition Review Committee where he provides CINC and Joint Chiefs of Staff views as well as his own views on resource management.

PLANNING

Senator TOWER. Should the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be more involved in the DOD long-range planning process?

General VESSEY. The JCS already have a decisive role in that process through a deliberate long-range planning process. With changes implemented by Mr. Weinberger in 1981, the role of the JCS was strengthened. The planning force levels recommended by the JCS in the annual Joint Strategic Planning Document have been accepted by the Secretary as long-term goals in his annual Defense Guidance. Also at the Secretary's initiative, the unified and specified commanders in chief (CINCs) began addressing the top DOD management level, the Defense Resources Board, commenting on CINC perspectives and requirements. The result of this increased interaction between the JCS, the CINCs and OSD has been a long-term planning process more responsive to military commanders' needs.

CJCS—UNIFIED COMMANDS RELATIONSHIPS

Senator TOWER. What is the proper relationship between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands?

General VESSEY. The proper relationship between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the unified commands would place the Chairman in the formal chain of command. As the law reads now, there is no military man in the chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the commanders of the unified and specified commands. The Chairman presides over the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and he communicates, at the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, orders to the commanders of the unified and specified commands (CINCs). Placing the Chairman into the chain of command makes explicit the Chairman's function as a link between the Secretary of Defense and the CINCs, an arrangement which already works well in practice.

CHAIRMAN'S SPOKESMAN ROLE

Senator TOWER. Should the law be changed to make it clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman functions as the spokesman for the unified commands?

General VESSEY. No, it is not necessary; that is already covered in existing practice.

DUAL-HATTING

Senator TOWER. Some critics have argued that the current JCS system does not encourage the Service Chiefs to put aside their individual service concerns in order to provide objective joint advice. Within the current JCS structure, can the Joint Chiefs of Staff make a meaningful contribution on controversial defense issues, particularly those that involve more than one service? Is the "dual-hatting" of the Service Chiefs an advantage or disadvantage in their performance of their joint duties?

General VESSEY. The JCS, in examining their own organization, determined that the "dual hatting" of the Service Chiefs offers a distinct advantage in that considerable benefits come from the forced discipline on the advisor who must consider his advice in light of his responsibilities. Each Service Chief's responsibilities as the senior uniformed officer of his own Service distinguishes him as best qualified to advise on the capabilities and limitations of his Service. Now there is a disadvantage and it is the great demands placed upon the Chief's time. However, the Chiefs referred back to the Eisenhower solution—the provision of Vice Chiefs to focus on the day-to-day operation of the Services. In wartime a Chief might have to spend most of his time as a member of the JCS and leave Service direction to the Vice Chief. In peacetime, however, there is time for a Chief to perform both jobs—to advise the President and Secretary of Defense while devoting a great deal of attention to his own Service.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

Senator TOWER. Does the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman require a Deputy to preside in his absence or is the current system of regularly rotating that responsibility among the Service Chiefs a workable arrangement?

General VESSEY. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not support creating a four-star Deputy or Vice Chairman. We prefer our current system of a quarterly Acting Chairman in my absence. There are some very good arguments for having a Vice Chairman, but the difficulty lies in the relationships between the Vice Chairman and the other Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree on a charter for a Vice Chairman which satisfactorily defined those relationships and, consequently, unanimously opposed establishing a Vice Chairman position. I might add that the Chairman has a three-star assistant and the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully support this position and the role of this individual. Also, our system of a quarterly Acting Chairman is working well.

CHAIRMAN ON NSC

Senator TOWER. The law currently designates the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisors to the National Security Council.

Would you support legislation that would formally appoint the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman to the National Security Council?

General VESSEY. Yes, I would. But as I said earlier, the administration is opposed. Under this administration, Joint Chiefs of Staff advice is heard at all NSC deliberations. I have attended every meeting, and this type of legislation would insure future Presidents have the benefit of the Chairman's presence at each NSC meeting.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that making the Chairman a member of the National Security Council will enable the Council to have the senior uniformed military officer participate in deliberations involving US military capability and preparedness. The Council will also have the benefit of the input of the spokesman for the combatant commanders who will implement military decisions recommended by the Council to the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the concern that such membership will in some way detract from civilian control of the military is unwarranted. The National Security Council is by law an advisory body to the President. The Secretary of Defense and the President, as the National Command Authorities, assign military missions thereby maintaining civilian control.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. DAVID C. JONES, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Senator TOWER. Does the advice of DOD civilian officials now overshadow that of professional military officers in areas of decision-making that should be dominated by the military?

General JONES. It varies. In operational matters I have found that usually Presidents and Secretaries of Defense follow the advice of the military. In other areas, it will carry greatly from one administration to another.

Senator TOWER. How can the role of professional military advice be maximized in the DOD decisionmaking process?

General JONES. No. The advice is oriented toward the interests of the individzontal advice to the Secretary. That is advice that cuts across the Service lines. The joint system as presently constituted does a poor job in this respect in that Service considerations still dominate. As a result, Secretaries have increased the number of military officers assigned to the OSD staff to about 500. This still has not solved the problem. Consequently, Secretaries either take on themselves the task of trying to figure out what should be done on cross Service issues or the cross Service issues tend to be ignored. Neither is a good approach. The joint system should be strengthened in a way that prevents Service domination.

Senator TOWER. Does the current structure of the JCS yield the kind of military advice that the President and the Secretary of Defense need.

General JONES. No. The advice is oriented toward the interests of the individual Services.

Senator TOWER. How do you judge the relative quality of first, the personal recommendations made by JCS members, and second, the written recommendations made by JCS members?

General JONES. Without question, the personal (oral) recommendations are far better. The committee recommendations are watered down and are invariably heavily influenced by individual Service considerations. That is one of the main reasons I have recommended that the Chairman provide advice to the Secretary after taking into account the views of the Service Chiefs and the CINCs. If a Service Chief differs with the Chairman, he can write a separate recommendation to the Secretary. The advice would then be much sharper and useful.

Senator TOWER. To what extent does the successful operation of the current JCS structure depend upon the characters and personal relationships of the Chairman and the Service Chiefs?

General JONES. President Eisenhower once said words to the effect that a good organization cannot guarantee success but a bad organization can guarantee failure. Personal relations are important but I submit that the very critical problems have not been addressed adequately these past 30 odd years even though we have had ten different Chairmen and dozens of different Chiefs. Individuals, competent or not so competent, have not had a great impact on the system.

Senator TOWER. To what extent have the JCS been involved in the budget of location process within the Department of Defense?

General JONES. The JCS have been involved but have had very little influence. The joint system being dominated by the Services almost invariably recommends the Secretary support the Service recommendations but he should give them more money. The Chairman can play an independent role but he is constrained by two factors. First, he has a staff of only five officers working on matters of substance. The Joint Staff works for the corporate body of the Chiefs. Second, the effectiveness of a Chairman depends on his getting the Chiefs to address hundreds of issues. If the Chairman makes a recommendation which is contrary to a fundamental interest of a Service, he will have trouble maintaining the support of that Service in addressing the many issues.

Senator TOWER. Should the Joint Chiefs participate more actively in the process that determines the allocation of defense resources?

General JONES. No, not as a collective body. The Service Chiefs should continue to advocate their own programs but the joint system should be strengthened so that the Chairman can provide recommendations on the many issues that cut across Service interests.

Senator TOWER. Should the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be more involved in the DOD long-range planning process?

General JONES. Yes. Long-range planning is very weak and needs much more attention.

Senator TOWER. What is the proper relationship between the JCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands?

General JONES. It should be very close with the Chairman providing the oversight of the commands and being their spokesman in Washington.

Senator TOWER. Should the law be changed to make it clear that the Chairman functions as the spokesman for the unified commands?

General JONES. Yes, but this alone will do very little to solve the fundamental problems.

Senator TOWER. Within the current JCS structure, can the JCS make a meaningful contribution on controversial defense issues, particularly those that involve more than one service?

General JONES. Yes, but to a very limited extent. My greatest concern though is not with the very controversial issues that receive great attention but with those that lie buried year after year. Many important roles and mission, command and control, cross Service support and other issues lie dormant.

Senator TOWER. Is the "dual-hatting" of the Service Chiefs an advantage or disadvantage in their performance of their joint duties?

General JONES. Both. Clearly it is an advantage that they have knowledge of their Service capabilities and a responsibility in their Service hat to support integrated operations. On the other hand, it results in Service interests dominating the joint arena. I believe the system should be changed so as to retain the advantages while eliminating the domination.

Senator TOWER. Does the JCS Chairman require a Deputy to preside in his absence or is the current system of regularly rotating that responsibility among the Service Chiefs a workable arrangement.

General JONES. There would be advantages to having a Deputy preside but I would not recommend a Deputy just for this function. A much more important job for the Deputy would be to help the Chairman in oversight of the CINCs.

The Chairman is now the only person who can really work with the CINCs in ferreting out the critical issues and in developing the options or alternatives. The Chairman is too busy under our current system to spend the time necessary to do this. I find it strange that the only officer in the military who is prohibited from having a Deputy is the officer with the greatest responsibilities.

Senator TOWER. Would you support legislation that would formally appoint the JCS Chairman to the National Security Council?

General JONES. Yes, but I do not believe this is an important issue or would help much in solving the most important problems.

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., October 4, 1983.

Hon. JOHN TOWER,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR JOHN: This afternoon at 2:30, the same time you've called this very interesting and important meeting, I must chair the Intelligence Committee on a mark-up of a most important bill.

The questions I have are, and I would direct these to each of the three gentlemen appearing before you today:

1. In your opinion, does this country need an overall strategic plan?
2. If you agree with this, would you be kind enough to sit down and outline the parameters you feel should be contained in that plan?

When we understand that strategic operations are undertaken in the furtherance of strategic plans prepared by the Department of Defense, I believe we can begin to get at it. The aim of strategy is defeat whatever enemy nation we might be confronted with. The tactics of that strategy can be left up to the tactical commands of each of the forces. What I am talking about is an overall strategy for the United States military to operate behind and within the plans and operations.

If you could do this it would be of great benefit to those of us who feel that an overall strategy is needed.

Sincerely,

BARRY GOLDWATER.

STRATEGIC PLAN

Senator GOLDWATER. In your opinion, does this country need an overall strategic plan? If you agree with this, would you be kind enough to sit down and outline the parameters you feel should be contained in that plan?

General VESSEY. There is no question that a coherent, well-understood strategy must guide our national security efforts. Some parameters which are needed, and which I believe exist today, are clear statements of policy as to our vital interests, our commitments to our friends and allies, and our goals and our objectives as a Nation. The strategy must take into account all aspects of our national power—our economic, military, diplomatic, political, and moral health—and define for us in broad terms what must be done to protect our way of life. The President and the National Security Council have set down a broad national strategy, goals and objectives in NSC documents. In consideration of those documents, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their annual publication of the Joint Strategic Planning Document recommended a national military strategy to the Secretary of Defense and he, in a large part included it in his Defense Guidance. In turn, the Joint Chiefs of Staff use this Defense Guidance as the basis for their broad war planning guidance that allows the combatant commanders to formulate their individual war plans.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

BUDGET INFLUENCE

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel the Service Chiefs have enough say in the formulation of the budgets for their Services?

General VESSEY. Yes, certainly more influence than any other person in their Service.

DEFENSE ISSUES

Senator THURMOND. Are you satisfied with the way controversial defense issues are resolved when they overlap service areas of responsibility?

General VESSEY. By their very nature, controversial issues are rarely resolved in a manner satisfactory to all. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that in order to provide the best military advice to the Secretary and President, they must address those controversial defense issues as they arise, or better, before they become issues. We have reviewed, for example, the conventional versus strategic funding levels in deliberations before our recommendations on the MX. We also have advised the Secretary of the impact on warfighting of various levels of defense spending. The Joint Staff's analytical capabilities which permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to play a larger role in these type issues are not as great as they could be, but we are working on alternatives to increase that capability.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. DAVID C. JONES, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Senator THURMOND. General Jones, as you stated in your article in the Armed Forces Journal, the Joint Chiefs must reach agreement before making a recommendation. Would you describe for us how this adversely impacts on the JCS ability to respond during a crisis?

General JONES. The Chiefs must normally reach an agreement or a disagreement before making a recommendation; however, in a crisis situation it is expected that the Chairman will make recommendations when there is not time for the corporate body to act.

Senator THURMOND. General Jones, you have stated that service chiefs spend more time pursuing resources than they do on war fighting capabilities. Why is this the case?

General JONES. Our entire system imposes requirements on the senior defense leadership, military and civilian, that results in the inordinate time spent on pursuing resources. There is very little stability in the system and the budget process is year around. The Congress must share some of the responsibility.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel the service chiefs have enough say in the formulation of the budgets for their services?

General JONES. There are some circumstances in which the service chiefs do not have enough say but generally they have great say. What is lacking is a system to insure that cross service issues are adequately addressed. The joint system has little say.

Senator THURMOND. Are you satisfied with the way controversial defense issues are resolved when they overlap service areas of responsibility?

General JONES. No. This is one of the weakest parts of our system.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE WILSON, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MILITARY ADVICE

Senator WILSON. Do you believe that the Chairman provides the best possible military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President? If not, why not?

General VESSEY. That's for Secretary Weinberger to say; but, let me give you a qualified yes. I provide the best advice I can, but I do recognize it could be better, particularly in joint operational requirements and resource management areas. I am pleased to say two major initiatives are underway which will improve our military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President in these areas. One is my Modern Aids to Planning (MAP) program which is designed to give the CINCs an improved analytical basis for developing and evaluating their war plans and determining their warfighting requirements. The second is increasing the analytical capability on the Joint Staff in support of the resource management process.

CHAIRMAN'S ACCESS

Senator WILSON. Does the Chairman have adequate access to the Secretary of Defense and the President? If not, why not?

General VESSEY. Most definitely. The Chairman meets with the Secretary of Defense on a daily basis, and the JCS meet with him weekly. The JCS meet quarterly with the President, and have met with the President more than any previous body of Chiefs, and the Chairman has more frequent, personal contact with the President. He attends all the National Security Council meetings and National Security Policy Group meetings with the President.

QUALITY OF JOINT STAFF

Senator WILSON. Is the quality of the Joint Staff as high as possible? If not, why not?

General VESSEY. The officers assigned to the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are highly competent and they are working very hard and well on tough issues affecting the security of the Nation. Now, the most important qualification they bring with them to the Joint Staff is their expertise in their parent Service. The last thing we need is a corps of professional paper pushers. As experts in their service, they can contribute best in the staff process by advising on the capabilities and limitations of their service.

But let me say this, many lack experience in joint duty. A recent study, for example, shows that less than 20 percent of officers serving on the Joint Staff have had Joint Staff experience. We have begun several initiatives to help resolve this problem. First, we are developing a training program for officers to take immediately upon their arrival in the Joint Staff. This training will enable all of the newly assigned officers to be more productive, sooner. A second initiative is to develop a system that will enable the services to assign officers to lower level joint and combined staffs early in their careers and to levels of increased responsibility as they advance in their careers. They will then carry with them to the Joint Staff some of that experience which we lack today. Third, we support the provisions of the administration's proposed bill which, if enacted, will permit earlier recall of officers to the Joint Staff, eliminate the artificial ceiling (400) on the number of officers who can be assigned to the Joint Staff at any given time, extend their tour length to 4 years, and eliminate existing restrictions which limit individual Director's tours to 3 years and preclude their reassignment to that position. These initiatives, when fully implemented, will have a very positive impact on the quality of advice provided to the JCS by the Joint Staff.

ANALYTIC PRODUCT

Senator WILSON. Is the analytic product of the Joint Staff of the highest quality and maximum utility? If not, why not?

General VESSEY. The Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA) is the analytic agency of the JCS. SAGA studies and analyses are of the highest quality and are put to the maximum use. This small analytical group produces both dynamic and static assessments, politico-military simulations, general purpose and strategic nuclear force analyses, and negotiation analyses. Yet more analyses are needed, especially in resource management, crises analyses, and war planning areas. The Joint Staff is investigating alternative methods to meet these analytical needs and improvements are forthcoming.

CHAIRMAN'S ACCESS TO CINCS' VIEWS

Senator WILSON. Does the Chairman have adequate access to the Unified and Specified Commanders and their views on such matters as resource allocation?

General VESSEY. Yes, the unified and specified commanders' views are often solicited any they have direct access to me and I to them. And I am their spokesman in Washington. I also encourage them to air their views at our periodic CINCs' Conferences.

The CINCs are charged with carrying out our war plans. Their needs are central to the PPBS process. As such, steps have been taken for the CINCs to fulfill the role established for them by the National Security Act. Through their active participation in Defense Resources Board summer program review and

Defense Guidance development, the CINCs have a significant influence in PPBS both in their own right and through me, their spokesman for operational requirements.

CIVILIAN MICROMANAGEMENT

Senator WILSON. Is there micromanagement of military operations by civilian defense officials?

General VESSEY. As I mentioned earlier, I think at every level we dabble into too much detail. It is a part of our system, and I understand why we do it. But, to answer your question, no, not during my time as Chairman. I would like to expand. My view is the civilian leadership should establish broad policy guidance. establish objectives, set fiscal guidance and supervise—leaving to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the military functions of advising on military matters, developing military strategy and war plans, maintaining readiness and conducting military operations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE WILSON, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. DAVID C. JONES, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND GEN. LOUIS H. WILSON, U.S. MARINE CORPS (FORMER COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS)

Senator WILSON. Do you believe that the Chairman provides the best possible military advice to the Secretary and the President? If not, why not?

General JONES. The Chairman is constrained by the fact he has only five people working for him on matters of substance. The Joint Staff works for the corporate body. There is not a good way to address alternatives not supported by the services.

Senator WILSON. Is the quality of the Joint Staff as high as possible? If not, why not?

General JONES. No. The rewards for serving on the Joint Staff are far less than for serving in certain areas on a service staff. For example, the O–6's on the Joint Staff receive far fewer promotions than do O–6's assigned to the service planning staffs. Very few officers seek duty on the Joint Staff.

Senator WILSON. Is the analytic product of the Joint Staff of the highest quality and maximum utility? If not, why not?

General JONES. No. The analytical effort on the Joint Staff is primarily limited to strategic nuclear warfare. The overwhelming majority of analytical capability resides in the individual services.

Senator WILSON. Does the Chairman have adequate access to the Unified and Specified Commanders and their views on such matters as resource allocation?

General JONES. Yes.

Senator WILSON. Is there micromanagement of military operations by civilian defense officials?

General JONES. Quite often, but it varies from administration to administration and even within administrations. The micromanagement is prevalent in the day to day running of the Department. The services are doing many of the things the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be doing (determining strategy and force structure). The Office of the Secretary of Defense (the large Defense staff) does many of the things the services should be doing (the day to day management of programs based on clear cut policy guidelines from the Office of the Secretary of Defense).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. DAVID C. JONES, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Senator LEVIN. General Jones, please provide examples of what specific recommendations or actions you would have made or taken, if your JCS reform proposal had been in effect, that you did not make or take because of the compulsion to reach consensus decisions among the Joint Chiefs.

General JONES. If I had the answer I would have made different recommendations or taken different actions. I am proposing a change in the system so that a mechanism can be developed to insure that alternative courses of action can be addressed without Service interests dominating. These tools are not available today.

Senator LEVIN. General Jones and General Wilson, whom do the Chiefs represent—their own services or the corporate group of the Joint Chiefs?

General JONES. Both. However, the subject being reviewed by the Chiefs have already been addressed in detail by the Service staffs. Service positions have been developed, and the Chiefs have been briefed by their service staffs. As expected, a Chief normally supports the position of his service staff. There are a few exceptions.

Senator TOWER. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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